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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

Latin Sentence Connection. By CLARENCE WHITTLESEY MENDALL, Ph. D. Yale University Press, 1917.

Latin Sentence Connection is the third in a series of Yale studies on sentence connection which were suggested by Dr. Morris, the first two studies being Dr. Mendell's Sentence Connection in Tacitus (1911) and Miss Nye's Sentence Connection, Illustrated Chiefly by Livy (1912). In fulfilling the promise of his earlier work Dr. Mendell has based his results in his present work, as he tells us in the Preface, p. vii, "in part on my own complete collection from Tacitus of the instances of adjacent sentences not connected by conjunctions; in part on the results of a special study of Cato and Sallust and the younger Pliny entire, of some three hundred pages of Cicero and about the same amount of Seneca, of three books of Caesar, three of Livy, four of Quintilian, and four lives of Suetonius; in part on material drawn from casual reading," the collection including over fourteen thousand cases. The object of the investigation, he tells us, is "to discover a more fundamental standpoint for the consideration of sentence relations, and to do away with the somewhat artificial distinction between coordinate and subordinate by means of a more thorough understanding of the nature and origin of each."

The book is divided into eight chapters, I and II being introductory. In Chapter I Mendell deals in a general way with the psychological processes underlying the making of sentences and the expression of their interrelation. He warns particularly against the misconception of each sentence as an isolated unit, and states that it is the failure to recognize that all adjacent sentences are related (at least in the thought of their author), and also the tendency to overemphasize conjunctive connection, as if this were the only means of sentence connection, that make way for his investigation.

In Chapter II the means employed to express sentence relation are divided roughly into three groups "according to the chief element which gives to each its power to express thought relations and so convey them to the reader." These three groups are: I, Repetition (ex. "The man has a *dog*. The *dog* is yellow;" or "If I ascend up into heaven, Thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold Thou art there"); II, Change (ex. "*John* went sailing. *William* was afraid"); III,

Incompleteness: (a) Retrospective (ex. "*Afterwards* John sat down"), (b) Anticipatory (ex. "He spoke the *following* words"), (c) Parenthetic (ex. "John, *I tell you*, went sailing"). This three-fold division is of course not hard and fast. More than one element may be made use of to express connection, and it is not always easy to tell which has the determining influence. For instance, in the second example given under I, not only is there verbal repetition in the second "Thou art there," but there is functional repetition in the second "if" and there is change in the contrast of "I ascend up into heaven" with "I make my bed in hell."

Chapters III-VII are taken up with the consideration of the several groups and sub-groups enumerated above: Repetition, Retrospective Incompleteness, and Change in III, IV, and V, respectively, all being retrospective in character; Anticipatory Incompleteness in VI; and Parenthetic Incompleteness in VII.

It would be impossible in the space allotted to follow Mendell carefully through all the phases of his discussion. However, a brief survey of one typical and significant chapter may serve at least to show his method of analysis and treatment, and such a chapter is the third.

This chapter is devoted to Repetition. Of this there are two different general types, Repetition of Content and Repetition of Function. An example of the first is the following from Caesar, B. G. III. 18. 7: *ad castra pergunt*. *Locus erat castrorum editus*, etc. Here *castrorum*, though in a different case, repeats in its entirety the content of *castra* of the first sentence. As an example of the second type may be taken the following from Livy XXIII. 9. 5: *sed sit nihil sancti, non fides*, etc.; *audeantur infanda*, etc. Here there is repetition of function, *sit* and *audeantur* having but one thing in common, their subjunctive force expressing a hypothetical command.

There is also another distinction between the two types. In the first example the second sentence expresses a new idea logically proceeding from the thought expressed in the first, whereas in the second example the second sentence, though presenting a new idea, does not proceed logically from the first sentence, but is rather parallel with it, proceeding, as did the first sentence, from something antecedent to both sentences. These two types illustrate well two of the three relations which a sentence may have to the one immediately preceding it: first, it may be, and usually is, logically subsequent; second, it may be logically coincident; third, it may be, by reversal of the usual order, logically antecedent.

Of the simple types of Repetition of Content and of Function illustrated above Mendell points out many variations and extensions too numerous to set down here. One important extension, however, may serve as an interesting example. At

the opening of Caesar's *Bellum Alexandrinum* are the sentences *Bello Alexandrino conflato, Caesar Rhodo atque ex Syria Ciliciaque omnem classem arcessit; Creta sagittarios, equites ab rege Nabataeorum evocat; tormenta undique conquiri et frumentum mitti, auxilia adduci iubet*. At first glance there are apparently no repetition and no sign of sentence relation; and, indeed, the association is not immediate. Mendell points out, however, that there are words in the second sentence which fall naturally into a fairly obvious common category with words in the first, that between the concept behind the first word or phrase and that behind the second, or repeating, word or phrase there is an intermediate concept embracing both. Thus *Creta* at the beginning of the second sentence is in a common category with *Rhodo*, *Syria*, and *Cilicia* of the first, not only as a place, but also as a Roman dependency, so that there is after all a well defined element of repetition in the use of *Creta*. Again, behind *classem* in the first sentence and *sagittarios, equites, tormenta*, etc. of the second, is the larger concept of military forces. Likewise, in *Livy XXXIV. 52. 10, Ipse deinde Quinctius in urbem est invectus. Secuti currum milites frequentes*, the *currum* of the second sentence takes up part of the picture suggested by *est invectus*.

On the matter of Repetition of Content Mendell concludes that this method of connection is evidently used to indicate that the sentence in which the repetition occurs is logically subsequent to that from which the concept is repeated. He finds that instances of such repetition fall into three types of relationship: first, the second sentence may indicate merely an additional item; second, it may indicate the result of the first sentence; third, it may indicate the explanation of the first sentence. Which of these three relationships is intended is, of course, not always clear, and it was to insure greater clearness and precision that the conjunctions *et, nam, igitur*, etc., came to be used as supplementary to the more fundamental means. Mendell reminds us that normally these conjunctions only make obvious and precise a relation which is already expressed.

Repetition of Function is represented by the repetition of a conjunction, of a noun or pronoun, usually in exactly the same form and the same relative position, of a verb,—all these being examples of what later came to be the figure called anaphora,—and by repetition of verb function, as already seen in the example from *Livy XXXIII. 9. 5*, or in the familiar *veni, vidi, vici*. The fundamental relation indicated by repetition of function is always the same: the sentences are always logically coincident. In consequence, it is not surprising to find that the conjunctions used with this kind of repetition are very few, *et, que, and aut*.

In like manner Mendell continues with a thorough discussion of the other means of expressing sentence relation. Perhaps the simple examples in English of these various means given at the beginning of this review will be sufficient at least to suggest the kind of examples in Latin from which Mendell draws his conclusions; and there is space only to indicate these conclusions.

From his consideration of Retrospective Incompleteness, the subject of Chapter IV, Mendell concludes that the type of sentence relation is not determined by the incompleteness itself,—“the incompleteness serves to call attention to the relation rather than to define it,”—but that it is determined rather by the element of Repetition of Content almost always present in Retrospective Incompleteness, whether semantic or functional; and therefore it will be found that in most cases of Retrospective Incompleteness the second sentence is subsequent logically to the first.

In Chapter V, devoted to a discussion of Change, Mendell calls attention to the fact that in sentences in which Change is used as the means of expressing relation, the principles of Repetition and Incompleteness frequently occur. This, he says, has led at times to the discarding of Change as a means of expressing relation; but he points out that the other means simply *indicate* or *call attention* to the relation, which is *defined* by the principle of Change. He adds that, of course, inasmuch as semantic change occurs in practically every sentence, it is necessary that the change, in order to define the relation, should be abrupt enough to compel attention and should occur between words essentially or at least temporarily in some common category. For example, “It is a glorious day. Phalaris was a tyrant,” obviously have no relation, certainly not in a logical, sane mind, whereas “The day is *heavy*. My heart is *light*,” fulfill all the requirements. Mendell finds that in all the examples of semantic change the type of relation is the same: the two clauses are in contrast with each other (this determined by the change), and are usually coincident (this determined by repetition of function). Change of Function Mendell finds to be on the whole insufficient for an accurate defining of relation.

For examples of Anticipatory Incompleteness, the subject of Chapter VI, Mendell refers particularly to the use of subordinating conjunctions, demonstratives, comparative adjectives and adverbs, such verbs as *licet*, *oportet*, *necesse est*, and such adjectives as *alter* and *ceterus*. The clause in which the element of anticipatory incompleteness occurs, whether the incompleteness is semantic or functional, is always logically antecedent to the clause following. Mendell calls particular attention to the fact that the expression of sentence relation

in the first of two sentences, rather than in the second, as in the case of all the other means considered, represents deliberate preparation on the part of the speaker or writer and is not simple or naive, but is a conscious rhetorical development.

Parenthetic Incompleteness, discussed in Chapter VII, may be illustrated by sentences in which verbs such as *dico*, *inquam*, *quaeso*, etc., are interjected into statements or questions. Numerous examples will readily be called to mind. Such a parenthetical interjected phrase indicates an idea logically antecedent to the clause in which it is inserted, and Mendell points out that "the fact that syntactically it developed into the main clause, while the clause to which it lent tone, the one into which it was injected, became the subordinate clause, is only a further illustration of the essential difference between logical and syntactical relation."

In his Conclusion, Chapter VIII, Mendell briefly recapitulates, and in addition suggests certain lines along which, in the light of the contribution made by his present work, the origin and development of the subordinating conjunction may be studied. It is to be hoped that such a study will be undertaken with the same thoroughness and soundness of judgment as that displayed by Dr. Mendell.

As to actual results, there is no doubt but that Dr. Mendell attained his object of discovering a more fundamental point of view for the consideration of sentence relation. We shall no longer look to the conjunctions as the only signs, and asyndeton and polysyndeton take on a new and more significant aspect. It is questionable, however, whether we are yet ready to do away with the distinction between coordinate and subordinate. Our point of view may have to be shifted, but the distinction still remains, and artificial though it may be and the outgrowth of a more fundamental distinction, it is undoubtedly a distinction felt by and influencing all artistic writers.

THOMAS DEC. RUTH.

Deux érudits gallois, John Rhys et Llywarch Reynolds. Par H. GAIDOUZ. Extraits de la Revue Internationale de l'Enseignement, 1917 (5 numéros). Paris, Société de l'enseignement supérieur, 96 Boulevard Raspail, 1917. 8°.

This series of articles by a distinguished Celtic philologist—known above all as the founder and principal editor of the *Revue Celtique*—is a tribute to the memory of two of his fellow-scholars and personal friends. John Rhys was born at Abercaero (Wales) in 1840 and died at Oxford on December